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Objectively Funny Jokes:
Comedy’s El Dorado or a Simple MacGuffin?
Mike Cundall
Could there ever be an objectively funny
joke or bit of humor? With the popularity of certain
forms of humor, with the appearance of puns as
consistent stages in the development of humor in
children, this seems a reasonable query. Further,
give recent developments in humor theory, and
depending on what stance you take on what is
essential to the funny or humorous your answer
could be yes or no.
Historically, given the prevailing theories of humor
to date, the answer would have been a resounding
‘no’. Whether you were a Hobbesian leviathan
superior to all, or a Freudian fellow with your mental
plumbing bound up like your mother’s panties
(apologies for mixing my metaphors), or a callous
incongruitest, the answer has to be nopety-nope.
The unifying thread through these disparate
theories, and others in the incongruity family, of
which our esteemed Richard C. Richards is an elder
statesman, who certainly won’t find this essay a
worthy honor, is that humor is a consumer-sided
event—a demand side theory. Humor is in the mind
of the experiencer. If it turns out that arrangement
of elements on the side of a building looked like a
funny face, then it was funny. The very fact that
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there is a needed cognitive appreciation by the
receiver of the joke in order for humor to occur,
settles the case. To imagine a universal joke that
would elicit mirth from an individual is to tilt at
windmills. It’s, in the immortal words of Vizzini,
“inconceivable.” What one might find incongruous,
or illustrative of superiority, or redirects my mental
or neural plumbing to release laughter and humor, is
specific to the individual. Cultures, individual
histories are all too vast, too varied, dare I say, to
incongruous, to expect that there be a joke pulled
from the bowels of the comedy club that bestows
upon the teller, like Excalibur to Artie, a guaranteed
laugh.
But there are new players on the field and
we shan’t be bound to the mistaken theories of our
forebears no matter how august the thinker (looking
at you, Richards). So, let us give heed to a new brand
of humor theory—a demand side approach. An
approach that favors the would be joke creator, as
opposed to the plebian audience. One, if accurate,
would offer up an answer to our leading question in
the positive. One that would not only tilt at the
windmills, but actually knock ‘em down. One that
finds the fountain of youth, and lays claim to the
comic grail of the universally funny joke: an answer
that would pierce the incongruous heart of darkness
and bring forth the heart of gold. And what upstart
could propose such a radical turning of the humor
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theories on their respective ears? Why none other
than our own Steven Gimbel. A man whose august
status is rivaled only by the length of his hair.
Exorbitant as Gimbel’s recent book, Isn’t
that Clever? is, (he does claim to find El Dorado, so
maybe it’s worth the gold) is a healthy and needed
look at humor theorizing that incorporates
philosophy of science (Hempel is grinning right now,
though the irony is lost on Popper) and a careful
attention to those who craft jokes (Gimbel is a
studied and practiced comedian). Gimbel’s novel
addition to humor theory is his focus on a
shortcoming in the dominant theory of humor, the
incongruity theory and his alternate theory of
humor. Gimbel explores the worry that incongruity
becomes a vacuous term or one that is drawn out so
broadly as to be trivially true. It is what it is after all.
Gimbel then presents an alternative theory that
wants to focus not on the perception of humor, but
on the object of humor itself. Instead of relying on
some audience dullard to note the incongruity
presented to them, Gimbel argues that humor is “An
act is humorous if and only if it is an intentional,
conspicuous act of playful cleverness.” (Gimbel,
2017) This theory is of great relief to all failed comics
out there (perhaps Gimbel is sublimating his rage?).
For me, I now realize that I am damn humorous and
my wife and all those students who heretofore have
not “gotten” my jokes in class, well phooey on them.
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Much of the power and support to be found
for Gimbel’s approach comes from the attention he
pays to how people discuss humor. He cleverly notes
that many people recognize humor as such even
when they do not find the humor on offer mirthful.
To Gimbel’s mind, and rightly so it seems, this is a
tacit recognition that while one didn’t find it funny, it
still is humor, and hence humor is not simply a
demand side event. To recognize something as
humor, but a failed attempt, already shows that
humor is not simply reliant on a chortle or guffaw to
be real humor. And while laughs may pay the bills,
humor is more indigent, or perhaps indignant.
Apparently, I have been making jokes for a very long
time.
It’s worth exploring more what Gimbel
notes about our language when we discuss humor.
In the semi-rhetorical query “You’re joking right!?”
one sees a glimmer of what humor really is. Gimbel
notes that either way one answers supports his view
that humor is a supply side phenomenon. If you
respond in the negative, then it isn’t a joke, my mirth
or laugh were it present is inappropriately placed. If I
answer in the affirmative, then the laughter is
proper. Were it the case that humor was truly
subjective, then the answer given by the
interrogated wouldn’t matter. My laughter or lack
thereof would be proper only insofar as I found it
funny or not. Come to think of it, this would make
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current White House press briefings a whole lot
easier. But to return to Gimbel’s point, the fact that
it is perfectly sensible to discuss and assign a proper
or improper response based on whether the
utterance was taken as a joke or not, indicates that
there is a whole lot more than simple subjectivity in
humor. Humor is more than the cognitive
achievement of the perceiver. There is an important
and totally ignored part of the attempt at humor. A
thing agreed upon, but sometimes failed to achieve.
Kudos to Gimbel for this work.
Now we’re running short of time and space
for a Feschriften sort of article; well at least an LPS
Feschriften. But, if as Gimbel notes, the study of
humor is really now working as a mature science and
is really into the puzzle solving phase, what we have
here is a genuine puzzle. Humor is either a supply
side, objective sort of phenomenon, or it’s a demand
side, subjective phenomenon? I think there is some
philosophical legerdemain in the way that Gimbel
casts incongruity theorists as subjectivists, though I
cannot for the moment clearly define why. But the
truth is, his points about the recognition of failed
humor are strong, which strongly indicates that
there is something of great importance in the
attempt to be funny.
What I will suggest, in a hand-waivy, I-can’tbe-held-responsible-for-clearly-saying-why-at-themoment sort of way, is that our discussions of
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humor may be enriched if we approach humor as a
success term. The best possible exemplar,
paradigmatic humor if you will (damn you Tom
Kuhn), would be a case where someone intends to
be funny, using cleverness, and that the audience
does indeed find the act to be humorous. If we set
this as the best of all possible humor, then we can
preserve elements of the incongruity theory worth
preserving, as well an bring aboard Gimbel’s insight.
The upshot of this is that this approach is supported
by some of what is taken as a good characteristic of
scientific theorizing, broad range. A theory that
brings under one tent the supply side and the
demand side covers more of the phenomena of
humor. And this is a step in the right direction. Our
honoree would surely applaud the maintenance of
the need for incongruity, and our man responsible
for the honors will be pleased. It also has the benefit
of widening the scope of our research and
maintaining some of our intuitions on what humor
is. And if science has ever liked anything, it certainly
has to be explanations that cover more. Am I right?
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